A Simple Tax Filing Model

Model Set-up and Taxpayer Behavior
This section presents a simple tax filing model based on Keen and Slemrod (2017) .
Consider a taxpayer i who earns an income (gross profit) y i , with y i ∼ G(y), incurs a tax filing cost f , and is taxed at a rate t on income above a threshold T ≥ 0. All taxpayers are required to file a tax declaration. This also applies to taxpayers below the exemption threshold, as they may provide valuable information to the tax authority. A taxpayer who does not file is inspected with probability p(a) where p a > 0, a being the administrative enforcement level, 1 and inspected non-filers suffer a penalty θ proportional to their income y i . The non-filing penalty θ y i may represent the monetary and reputational cost of a temporary shop closure, a bribe to avoid a shop closure or fine, or the fear of an inspection. The implicit assumption 1 Without affecting the core results, one can bring the model closer to the data by assuming that larger firms are more likely to be inspected (and hence more likely to file), p y > 0. In this case, it would also be reasonable to assume p ya > 0.
1 that the government collects no revenue from inspected non-filers is close to reality. 2 To further simplify the exposition, we assume that taxpayers are risk-neutral and that y i is the income detectable by the tax authority. Filers thus always declare y i and we can ignore the intensive margin of compliance.
Assuming f > pθ T > tT , ∃ȳ ≡ f −tT pθ −t > T such that taxpayers file if y i >ȳ . The government thus has to set (or create the perception that) p(a)θ > t to ensure that at least a fraction of taxpayers file voluntarily. The filing propensity then increases in the non-filing penalty and the probability of detection, and decreases in the tax rate, filing cost, and exemption threshold. Heterogeneity in filing costs f could yield a situation in which there are non-filers and filers among both firms above and below the exemption threshold, as is empirically the case. 3
Welfare Considerations
Given a continuum of taxpayers of mass one, the share of filers is 1 − G(ȳ) = 1 − G( f ,t, θ , T, a). We assume that all taxpayers derive a value v(g) from the public good g which the government provides. The government budget constraint is g + a = R = t ∞ y max(y − T, 0)dy. Given this constraint, the government maximizes social welfare
2 Allowing the government to instead collect a fine from non-filers would complicate the model, but, provided some parameter restrictions that ensure that the government would prefer firms to file voluntarily rather than pay the fine, the model would still yield the same results.
3 The higher initial non-filing rate among corporations compared to the self-employed in Costa Rica, despite the the absence of an exempt income amount for corporations, could be explained by the higher average income levels and a negative correlation between firm size and filing costs.
2
A discrete investment in administrative enforcement ∆a increases p(a) by ∆p from p 0 to p 1 , lowersȳ fromȳ 0 toȳ 1 , and hence increases tax filing and payment, assumingȳ 0 > T . The filers have to pay the filing cost and those with y i >ȳ 1 have to pay the tax, but they no longer face the risk of the non-filing penalty. The remaining non-filers, in contrast, face a larger expected penalty, which generates no benefit to the government. The intervention ∆a is welfare enhancing if it generates a sufficiently large gross revenue increase ∆R = t 
Extensions
We consider two extensions relevant to our empirical application:
• Filers with y < T provide valuable information to tax authority: If filers below the exemption threshold provide information, e.g., about transactions with clients and suppliers, to the tax authority, and this information reduces the cost of future tax enforcement a or increases the detectable income level y, even an intervention that pushesȳ (further) below T could generate positive welfare gains. This is especially likely if filing costs fall discontinuously at y i = T , because firms that file but do not make a payment avoid an additional errand (going to the bank).
• Deregistration: Firms with high filing costs might decide to deregister in response to an increase in enforcement. Assume that a deregistered yet still active firm faces a punishment (detection probability and fine) q(a) · φ y < 3 p(a) · θ y and incurs a loss k i due to lost access to some public services. A firm deregisters in response to an increase in p (which leaves q unaffected) if its filing cost f is sufficiently high and its valuation for the public good k i is sufficiently low (compared to firm size), i.e.,
(1 − p 0 θ )y i > (1 − qφ )y i − k i > (1 − t)y i − f i and (1 − qφ )y i − k i > (1 − p 1 θ )y i > (1 − t)y i − f i .
2 Potential Value of Additional Third-Party Information
To calculate the potential value of additional third-party information generated by the intervention, we make the following considerations. The tax authority uses third-party reports in desk audits targeted at taxpayers who reported sales lower than third-party reported sales or costs. Third-party reported sales are more conventionally used as a lower bound for the sales the taxpayer should self-report, but cost reports could conceivably play a similar role. In our case, the experiment generates new reports about treated firms' suppliers (which are sales reports for the reportee) and reports about clients (which are cost reports for the reportee). We thus calculate the additional value of both types of reports separately.
We assume that, when contacted by the tax authority and informed about the new third-party information, firms increase reported sales by the amount of the new third-party report, but compensate by increasing reported costs so as to keep the reported profit rate constant. This means the reported profit rate on the newly declared sales is the same as the initially reported profit rate. This is consistent with the results from desk audits reported in Brockmeyer and Hernandez (2018) and similar to the assumption made in that paper in the calculation of tax revenue lost due to under-reporting.
In our calculation, we use the estimates from Table 4 in the paper, as well as estimates from regressions in which we separately consider unmatched reports about suppliers and unmatched reports about clients as outcome variables (results available upon request). To be conservative, we consider only unmatched reports about under-reporters (as defined in the footnote to Table 4) as valuable, and ignore the new reports about non-filers.
We also use the average transaction amount reported in third-party reports about clients and suppliers (which does not significantly differ by treatment status conditional on filing a third-party report) and the average reported profit rate among our experiment firms' clients and suppliers that are the subject of unmatched reports, 4 and we assume that firms' income is such that they pay a marginal tax rate of 15%.
• These figures amount to 20% and 12% of the total return of the experimental treatment. As the increase in unmatched reports about misreporting suppliers was positive but not statistically significant, we retain the conservative result that the generation of new third-party reports could increase the return of the experiment by up to 20%, under the assumptions laid out in this section. Note: This table displays summary statistics for firms that filed income tax in 2014 by the filing deadline versus firms that did not and that were part of our experiment sample (i.e., had an email address on file). The rows display means, with standard errors in parentheses. Amounts are in million CRC. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to below or above median sales. For non-filers, sales in the most recent period is the maximum of sales reported in the most recently available tax declaration and the most recent third-part report (as far back as 2010). For filers, we use the maximum of the most recent sales report and the current third-party report. The results are robust to alternative sales definitions. Note: This table displays summary statistics for firms that filed income tax in 2014 by the filing deadline versus firms that did not and that were part of our experiment sample (i.e., had an email address on file). The rows display means, with standard errors in parentheses. Where different from the column total, the number of observations is displayed in brackets. Amounts are in million CRC. Columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to below or above median sales. For non-filers, sales in the most recent period is the maximum of sales reported in the most recently available tax declaration and the most recent third-part report (as far back as 2010). For filers, we use the maximum of the most recent sales report and the current third-party report. The results are robust to alternative sales definitions.
Tables
8 To determine which firms were covered by third-party information, the tax authority considered all reports by other firms, by state institutions, and by credit/debit card companies. A small number of firms in the study shared the same primary email address, either because they had a common owner or shared a common legal representative. For this reason, firms were grouped into clusters based on their primary email address and randomization took place at the cluster level. Throughout our analysis, we use standard errors that are robust to within-cluster correlation, and the results are robust to limiting the sample to clusters with only one firm (98% of clusters). The mean number of firms per cluster is 1.04 and the median is 1. Of which, also income tax non-filers 1,376
Note: Authors' compilation based on tax authority's annual enforcement plans and their evaluations. This table contains a non-exhaustive list of documented enforcement activities conducted by the extensive control unit. It does not include interventions conducted by the units for payment arrears and taxpayer services. "Checks" and "followups" follow a detailed protocol underpinned by the tax administration regulations. They usually begin with a phone call, which (in case of no response by the taxpayer) is followed by an official notification with justification, a personal visit, the shop closure or administrative determination of amount to pay (as per a formula and all available information), and finally the transmission of the case to payment arrears (unless the amount owed is below a certain threshold) or to the audit department. The delay between each of these steps is specified by the regulation. Tax declarations presented or rectified in this process are checked by the assigned tax officer for consistency with third-party information and sector-specific average profit margins. "Messages" are done by email or SMS. Given data availability and the desire to have comparable information across years and types of activities, the figures in this table refer to planned activities (except for control of public events where only realized numbers were available). The execution rate varies between 70% and 150% and is on average close to the planned rate. The activities presented in this list are similar to control activities found in other low-and middle-income countries (e.g., Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Senegal).
*Out of the shop closures, about one half to one third are for non-filing, the remainder for non-emission of receipt or non-payment of declared taxes. Note: This table shows the balance of randomization in terms of firm characteristics, as measured before the experiment start. The rows correspond to the different variables. Columns 1-5 (6-10) correspond to the sample of firms with (without) third-party information, i.e., experiment 1 (2). Column 1 (6) displays the mean for the control group, columns 2 and 3 (7 and 8) show the mean difference between the control group and treatment groups 1 and 2, respectively, column 4 (9) reports an F-statistic from a test of the hypothesis that the two treatment groups are jointly equal to the control group, and column 5 (10) provides the corresponding p-value. Robust standard errors clustered by email address are in parentheses. TPI stands for third-party information (third-party reported sales), meaning the sum of sales reported by clients (D151), state institutions (D150), and credit/debit card companies (D153). The cutoffs of 2.5 million and 6 million CRC correspond to priority group designations used by the tax authority. When treated firms had two email addresses on file, the tax authority sent the same email to both. We ensure that the proportion of firms with two email addresses is balanced across control and treatment groups, and we control for second email addresses when we estimate treatment effects. As one regional tax office deviated from the experiment design and contacted firms prior to the start of the experiment date through phone calls and emails (different from the experimental emails presented in the previous sections), we also consider whether the occurrence of such early communication is balanced across treatment groups. Note: This table shows the balance of randomization in terms of outcomes, as measured by the day before the experiment start. The rows correspond to the different variables for fiscal year 2014. The number of months that a taxpayer filed and paid sales tax, and the sales tax payment are calculated over July 2013 until June 2014. Columns 1-5 (6-10) correspond to the sample of firms with (without) third-party information, i.e., sub-experiment 1 (2). Column 1 (6) displays the mean for the control group, columns 2 and 3 (7 and 8) show the mean difference between the control group and treatment groups 1 and 2, respectively, column 4 (9) reports an F-statistic from a test of the hypothesis that the two treatment groups are jointly equal to the control group, and column 5 (10) provides the corresponding p-value. Robust standard errors clustered by email address are in parentheses. 
(8) 
(8) Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on tax compliance in the medium-term. It is identical to Tables 5 and 6 in the paper, except that it does not control for firm characteristics. 
(8) Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on tax compliance in the medium-term. It is identical to Tables 5 and 6 in the paper, except that it controls only for firm characteristics but not for whether or not the firm was subject to a follow-up activity. 
(8) Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on tax compliance in the medium-term. It is identical to Tables 5 and 6 in the paper, but uses probit, OLS, and PPML models as per the column titles. Average partial effects are reported. 
1
A firm is considered small or inactive if it had third-party reported sales less than $2.5 million CRC and it did not file an income tax declaration for 2013.
2
A firm is considered likely to file for 2013 if it filed an income or sales tax declaration at any time in the three years before 2013 or it made an advance payment but did not file for 2013.
3
A firm is considered likely to file an informative declaration if it filed one in a previous year, it was the subject of a firm-to-firm informative declaration by the start of the experiment, and it had not yet filed one for the current year. (The reason that there are some observations who satisfy this condition for Panel C is that although firms were separated into two groups-those with and without TPI-for this experiment, a modest number of non-TPI firms (20%) were the subjects of firm-to-firm declarations after this separation. The fraction of non-TPI firms that were covered by a firm-to-firm informative declaration by the start of the experiment is balanced across treatment and control groups.) Table A21 Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on tax compliance in the medium-term. It reproduces Table 5 in the paper for different subsamples, as noted in the column titles. Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on tax compliance in the medium-term. It reproduces Table 6 in the paper for different subsamples, as noted in the column titles.
1
For columns 1-3, each regression is limited to firms that were the subject of the relevant third party report, i.e., firms that were previously reported by a state institution for column 1, by a private client or supplier for column 2, and by a card company for column 3.
2
A firm is considered unlikely to file an informative declaration if it did not file one (before the experiment began) for any year 2010-2014. 
(8) Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on income tax filing and payment (measured 15 weeks after the experiment start), with an interaction between the treatment indicator and different characteristics, as indicated by the column titles. The rows display the coefficients on the treatment indicator (pooling the two treatment groups), the coefficient on the characteristic, and the interaction between the treatment and the characteristic. Robust standard errors clustered by email address are in parentheses. The regressions use the same controls as in Table A8 . Note: This table displays OLS estimates of the treatment effect on income tax filing and payment (measured 15 weeks after the experiment start), with an interaction between the treatment indicator and different characteristics, as indicated by the column titles. The rows display the coefficients on the treatment indicator (pooling the two treatment groups), the coefficient on the characteristic, and the interaction between the treatment and the characteristic. Robust standard errors clustered by email address are in parentheses. The regressions use the same controls as in Table A8 , and use only the sample of firms with third-party information. TPI stands for third-party information (third-party reported sales), meaning the sum of sales reported by clients (D151), state institutions (D150), and credit/debit card companies (D153). The cutoffs of 2.5 million and 6 million CRC correspond to the priority group designations used by the tax authority. Note: Extending the discussion in section IV.B, this table presents an OLS regression analysis of taxpayers' responsiveness to repeated enforcement interventions. The regressions focus on taxpayers in our experiment that become non-filers again for the income tax in 2015 and received enforcement messages reminding them to file in April 2016. The regressions allow us to control for firm characteristics and examine the role of the follow-up activities in July 2015, which were intended to ensure the credibility of our experimental intervention. We regress an indicator for whether a taxpayer filed income tax for 2015 in response to receiving the enforcement email in April 2016 on indicators for our experimental treatment, whether the firm ultimately declared income tax for 2014, whether it was subject to a follow-up, and interactions of these indicators, controlling for firm characteristics as in our main results tables. We do not include the interaction between filing for 2014 and follow-up, because almost all firms that were subject to follow-up ultimately filed their declaration for 2014. Interpretation of results: Given the selection of the sample, having been treated in our experiment is negatively associated with responsiveness to the new intervention (column 1). However, this is true only for firms that did not file in response to the treatment. Firms that filed for 2014, both treated and non-treated, are actually more likely to respond to the new intervention than firms previously in the control group that did not end up filing (columns 2-3). In addition, the follow-up intervention "neutralizes" any potential perverse effect of our treatment. Firms that were subject to a follow-up are generally more responsive to the new intervention (column 4). Among 2014 non-filers, those that were treated and followed-up on are not less likely to respond to the new intervention than firms that were not treated at all in the experiment; and filers that were treated and followed-up on are marginally more responsive (column 6). Note: This figure displays the impact of follow-up activities conducted by the tax authority after July 15, 2015, targeting remaining non-filers for the income tax in 2014. Targeted firms were mostly firms with large amounts of third-party information, and were disproportionately in the control group. Tax officers were assigned to follow up on these taxpayers according to a detailed protocol, starting with a phone call, then a written communication or a visit, with the possibility of referring a case to audit in case of continued non-compliance. The control and treatment groups referred to in the graphs are our experimental control and treatment groups. Note: This figure displays heterogeneity in the main treatment effects. It is identical to Figure 3 in the paper, except that the horizontal axis here displays the relevant percentile of third-party reported-sales rather than the level of (log) sales at the relevant percentile, and that Panels A and F use ventiles instead of deciles. Note: These figures show the distribution of firms based on the ratio of self-reported sales to third-party reported sales, for firms with third-party information that filed an income tax declaration within fifteen weeks of the experiment start. Figure 5 in the paper displays the results of statistical tests for whether firms' likelihood to match self-reported sales to third-party reported sales differs significantly across treatment groups. Note: These figures show the distribution of firms based on the ratio of self-reported sales to self-reported costs, for firms with third-party information that filed an income tax declaration within fifteen weeks of the experiment start. Figure 5 in the paper displays the results of statistical tests for whether firms' likelihood to match self-reported sales to self-reported costs differs significantly across treatment groups. Note: These figures show the share of firms filing income tax (row 1), paying income tax (row 2), and filing a third-party informative declaration (D151) about a client or supplier (row 3), all for fiscal year 2015. Column A corresponds to firms with third-party information and column B corresponds to firms without third-party information. The vertical line in each figure indicates the filing deadline. The black solid line corresponds to the control group and the blue/red dashed lines correspond to the treatment group for the two different subsamples, as explained in Table A3 . The numbers indicate the mean for each outcome and treatment group at the deadline. Stars indicate a significant difference compared to the control group and come from regressions that include controls (as in Table  A8 ). Significance levels are noted as per convention: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Note: These figures show the sales tax filing rate for the months of January, February, and March 2016, as measured around different dates in March and April 2016 at which non-filers for the sales tax for the respective months received an enforcement email from the tax authority (similar to the one used in our experiment). The figure is otherwise constructed in the same way as Figure A11 . Note: These figures show the rate of income tax filing for fiscal year 2016, around January 18, 2017, when non-filers for the income tax for 2016 received an enforcement email from the tax authority (similar to the one used in our experiment). The different series distinguish taxpayers for whom this enforcement email was the second, third, fourth, or fifth time they received such an email for non-filing behavior. In constructing these groups, we take into account the 2016 and 2017 income tax non-filing campaigns, and the 2015 and 2016 sales tax non-filing campaigns, as discussed in section IV.B in the paper. Note: This figure shows the rate of filing for the income tax for 2014 and the sales tax for May 2015, among firms whose names were published online on August 10, 2015. The majority of these firms were also sales tax non-filers for February-April 2015, and 1,366 of them were also income tax non-filers for 2014 and part of our experimental sample (265 among the firms without third-party information, one with third-party information, and 1,100 among a separate SMS experiment). Among these firms whose names were published online, 412 ultimately filed sales tax for May 2015 and 61 filed income tax for 2014. Note: This figure displays results from an analysis of 31 country reports completed under the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT). TADAT is an assessment tool implemented globally by development partners and technical assistance providers including the IMF and World Bank. Bars 1-4 are coded based on a text analysis of the report, and reflect the share of countries that have access to any kind of third-party information (bar 1), and to specific types of third-party information (bars 2-4). Third-party information from state institutions includes customs and procurement information. Bars 5-8 display the share of countries receiving a grade of A or B (instead of C or D) for TADAT performance indicators P2-3-1, P2-3-2, P2-4, and P6-14, respectively. Grades are given by an external assessment team after a visit to the country and are backed by evidence. Panel B focuses on the subsample of low and lower-middle income countries according to the current World Bank classification. The results are similar when focusing on low-income countries only. The remaining countries are almost exclusively upper middle-income countries, not high-income countries.
